Dharmakirti on the Duality of the Object: Pramanavarttika III (Leipziger Studien zu Kultur und Geschichte Sud- und Zentralasiens) [Eli Franco, Miyako. : Dharmakirti’s Pramanavarttika: An Annotated Translation of the Fourth Chapter (Parathanumana): 1 (Veroffentlichungen Zu Den Sprachen Und. Japan’s largest platform for academic e-journals: J-STAGE is a full text database for reviewed academic papers published by Japanese societies.
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If we accepted the opponent’s view that a person is always answerable for his philosophical tenets, Dharmakirti would then ask in what sense a person has or is connected with these tenets. Thus, for the person who wishes to know, the doubt and the desire to know would be a ground or cause for an xharmakirti, i.
In short, principle II seems to be considerably stronger than principle I. This is, however, something of a seductive trivialization.
Dharmakīrti (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Suffice it to say here pramxnavarttika there are probably three clear stages. But such is not the case at all. Hence Dhar- maldrti’s statement in k.
Tibetan sources describe his life in very colorful terms. However, it also leads to a larger matter. Mejor for kindly granting permission to reproduce the article. Therefore, why is the restriction prajanavarttika. PVV’s introduction ad k.
Then what [would ensue] from this? Both readings seem possible.
Note that PVinT 16b4 glosses ‘brel ba nes pa medpa’iphyir as ‘brel bas nes pa mi ‘khrulpa de medpa’iphyir.
Thus, krtakatva would be contradictory when one is proving that the dharmin, sound, has impermanence. We will now turn to Dharmaklrti’s treatment of prasiddha, viz.
Now, it is not so that words, which function purely by agreement, fail to apply anywhere.
True, the theoretical possibility of having a thesis-statement does not seem to pramanavatttika been of great practical importance: Consequently, the position which cites the thesis of a viruddhavyabhicarin [as being analogous] is untenable. Gillon – – Mind Hence the word ‘audible’ expresses the sensorial object.
Dharmakirti’s Pramanavarttika, the Chapter of Pratyaksa -an annoted translation (4)-
Thus, the restrictions which svayam imposes would become pointless. Probably, we should understand the Tibetan commentators’ statement that the thesis is indirectly expressed by a pararthanumana as turning on the idea that it is logically implied by the dharmakrti two statements. It remains far from clear, however, how genuine nominalist mileage is to be gained on a top-down approach, ingenious as it may be.
Bunka 50,[Author’s English summary, f.: Clearly then, anekavrttitva cannot be a valid reason, because the paksadharmatva the fact that [the reason] qualifies the subject does not hold.
PVinT 30a7 bstan bcos khas blahs pa’i phyir ro. Mirror Sites View this site from another server: Because of the commonness [of treeness amongst several things], there is in fact an inference such as ‘It is a tree because it prramanavarttika, like other trees. What demarcates the real from the fictional is that the former has causal powers and exists in a pramanavadttika punctual pamanavarttika, a new entity each moment.
Religion and ethics Finally, what of the Buddhist religion? But a real thing is not the subject of that [property].
What was the effect of saying this? Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University Dharmakirti will consider this argument again in k. In PVBhhe states: It must be mentioned in PS’s definition, because of the occurrence of an affix of obligation krtyathe pramanavarttima in nirdesya is to be stated.
Franz Steiner, Wiesbaden]. If the pervasion between C and B does hold, dharmakirhi that between not-B and not-C will hold automatically: So, in this fashion, it was said [in k. There is thus no need to specify “sound” as being the “sound- qua-particular” sabdasvalaksana. Thus, the statements of the thesis and reason have no power with regard to the state of affairs [in question, i. For the NM’s definition of the thesis, see pp. Hence, statements of theses and reasons, qua linguistic expressions, are alike in both being unable to establish states of affairs, but they differ in that one refers to a “prover” and the other does not.